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The dangers of performative scientism as the alternative to anti-
scientific policymaking: a critical, preliminary assessment of South 
Africa’s Covid-19 response and its consequences 
 
Abstract 
At the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic South Africa was praised for decisive political leadership based 
on scientific advice and the strictness of the measures it imposed to limit domestic spread of the virus.  
This paper critically examines the South African response through two conceptual frameworks. The 
first frames an optimal policy response as a solution to an intertemporal welfare-optimisation 
problem. The need for governments to balance epidemiological considerations and public health 
measures with the negative consequences of non-pharmaceutical interventions to limit transmission 
is particularly acute in developing countries. The second considers the use of scientific evidence and 
expertise through the lens of scientism – undue deference to science. The South African government 
erred towards drastic action in the face of predictions by some scientific advisors of a catastrophe, but 
initially without a clear, public long-term plan. Its lockdown has caused serious economic and societal 
harm across a range of measures. But these costs have not been matched by proportional benefits in 
health system preparedness or, based on evidence three months into the epidemic, a definitive 
improvement in expected long-term epidemic outcomes. This failure, and the questionably confident 
basis for the original lockdown decision, has been obscured by the government’s performative 
scientism – a public performance of deference to science – even in the absence of transparent 
decision-making. One consequence was a slower correction of strategy than merited by evidence of 
limited benefits and high costs of the lockdown. Another was an unwillingness to admit and explain 
errors after the fact. The latter, combined with the convincingness of the initial performance 
undermined the behavioural dimension of policy – leading to beliefs among citizens that confounded 
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efforts by the state to adapt its policy stance through reopening schools, reducing the stringency of 
clinical guidelines and resuming various economic activities while nevertheless observing basic social 
distancing precautions. 
Keywords: Covid-19; public policy; scientism; welfare economics; South Africa; Africa. 
 
The South African government has been praised internationally for its rapid, “ruthlessly efficient” 
(Harding 2020a) response to the Covid-19 pandemic, stated reliance on scientific advice (Xinhua 2020) 
and the drastic measures it has imposed (Wadvalla 2020; WHO 2020b). Similar assertions have been 
made locally by academics and the national academy of science (Singh 2020; ASSAf 2020) and 
numerous media reports. This is in notable contrast to wealthier countries like the United States and 
United Kingdom, and other large developing countries such as Brazil and Tanzania, where 
governments appear to have acted tardily, failed to use relevant scientific expertise appropriately and 
in some instances had leaders who have made pseudoscientific claims. Many other governments have 
sought to emphasise their use of scientific evidence and advice in order to provide greater legitimacy 
to policy responses. However, though well-intentioned, science-informed policymaking is unarguably 
superior from a procedural perspective to uncaring, pseudoscientific or science-disregarding decision-
making, it does not guarantee better outcomes in a welfare economics sense. Overemphasis on 
extremely poor conduct risks overlooking serious flaws in more responsible policymaking approaches. 
That is particularly so when politicians and policymakers engage in what we will call performative 
scientism, in which decision-makers seek credibility for their approach by performing excessive 
deference to what they believe to be ‘science’.  
In that vein, we argue that the South African government’s emphasis on an ostensibly scientific 
approach has been extreme and simultaneously shielded it from necessary scrutiny in a decidedly 
unscientific manner, so that most praise has been premature or misplaced. The paper focuses on the 
period up to the end of May 2020 and the corresponding evidence available. None of the substantive 
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claims about the welfare benefits of the government’s response have been substantiated by evidence-
based analysis in the public domain. The government  repeatedly used a crude graphical comparison 
with the UK to claim that South Africa was “on a unique trajectory” (Abdool Karim 2020) and that its 
strict lockdown “has worked”. One of its modellers was widely reported as stating that the lockdown 
had “saved 20,000 lives” (Evans 2020) – a claim that appeared to corroborate the president’s 
announcement a month earlier that an extension of the lockdown would mean “that tens of 
thousands of lives may be saved” (Republic of South Africa 2020c). However, the methodology used 
to derive the claim was not made public and does not appear to be supported by subsequently 
published official projections predicting that between 48 million and 53 million South Africans of an 
estimated total population of 55 million would have been infected with SARS-Cov-2 by 1 November 
2020 (Silal et al. 2020). The claim also contrasts with a somewhat more muted insinuation of lives 
saved provided by the minister of health two weeks later, the basis for which was also not published: 
"Had we done nothing, estimates show that by this point, as many as 80,000 South 
Africans would have been infected, and nearly 2,000 of our brothers and sisters 
would have lost their lives," the minister said, citing scientific models and 
estimates. (Xinhua 2020) 
Given uncritical reporting and endorsement of such claims in the presence of calamitous anecdotes 
from northern Italy and Wuhan province in China, it is perhaps unsurprising that the government’s 
response found significant societal support. However, to the extent that this support was associated 
with the performative scientism of the state and media, it would have been based on a 
misapprehension of, or incorrect assumptions about, the government’s opaque strategy. Journalistic 
reporting suggests that the dominant impression of the media was that the government’s strategy 
was one of containment or otherwise drastic reduction in the total number of infections. The 
government’s lack of transparency is a notable failure in itself, but even the limited information in the 
public domain reflects important contradictions and failures in the approach taken. This is despite the 
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fact that all available evidence points to genuine public interest motives behind the state’s primary 
decisions.1  
There is growing evidence that the lockdown caused significant suffering among the poor and the 
broader negative economic and social effects could, including through fiscal channels, last for a 
generation. As the government has eased its lockdown via a ‘risk-adjusted strategy’ (Government of 
South Africa 2020a; Republic of South Africa 2020e) towards what appears to be a herd immunity 
strategy, the question arises as to whether the costs incurred from a six week strict lockdown were 
justified. And the failure to dispel public misapprehensions that led to initial approval could backfire, 
behaviourally and politically, as some South Africans resist measures to resume economic and social 
activity such as manufacturing and schooling while others abandon compliance with measures 
intended to ensure more manageable spread of the SARS-Cov-2 coronavirus. 
1. Pandemic response as an intertemporal optimisation problem   
The premise of this paper is that management of national epidemics is a form of temporal optimisation 
problem. In this section we provide a brief, non-formal overview of the structure of that problem that 
will serve as a basis for the detailed analysis of South Africa’s response. Two main options have been 
identified for national efforts to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic: suppression/containment and 
mitigation (Ferguson et al. 2020). The former aims to limit the virus to a small portion of the 
population, while the latter focuses on slowing the spread through the population but not necessarily 
reducing the ultimate number of infections.  In current terminology, the objective of mitigation is to 
‘flatten the curve’ of a national epidemic in order to reduce the pressure on national health systems 
(public and private). In the absence of a widely accessible vaccine or treatment, the policy tools 
available are targeted public health interventions and non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs). In 
current parlance, NPIs include various forms of social distancing in which interpersonal contact is 
reduced in order to limit the probability of transmission and lockdowns in which the state imposes 
measures to reduce social and economic activity with the same basic objective. Targeted health 
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interventions to identify, trace and isolate infected individuals are essential for containment but can 
also enhance the effectiveness of NPIs – especially in the early stages of a national epidemic.  
At one end of the spectrum, social distancing could involve continuing day-to-day life almost as normal 
but with the wearing of some form of face mask. At the other end it would involve individuals 
maximally limiting any contact with, or proximity to, others outside of their homes. Similarly, 
lockdowns can vary from relatively mild regulations that prohibit large gatherings to curfews that 
require individuals, other than designated essential workers, to stay in their homes except when 
engaging in activities deemed necessary for basic well-being. The more extreme the social distancing 
and lockdown measures the greater the impact on society and the economy through non-disease 
channels. The relationship between epidemiological outcomes and broader societal consequences will 
vary depending on pre-existing social conditions and economic structure. 
In this sense, for theoretically optimal policy making one would require a model that integrates 
epidemiological, health systems, economic and broader societal considerations. There have been 
some recent efforts along these lines (Alvarez, Argente, and Lippi 2020; Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt 
2020), though these are still relatively simple in terms of the range of welfare-relevant factors 
considered and unlikely to be of much use to policymaking in the current pandemic.  The widely stated 
notion that only epidemiological or public health expertise is relevant to policy decisions may be an 
inevitable response to inexpert and pseudoscientific assertions about epidemiology, as well as a 
reflection of prior conceptions of scientific expertise (Suldovsky, Landrum, and Stroud 2019), but is 
misplaced from the perspective of making societally optimal policy decisions. And while there may not 
be sufficient evidence to satisfy the standards of formal cost-benefit analysis (Appleby 2020), policy 
decisions have to be made. In the case of Covid-19, there is currently little evidence that basic 
epidemiological outcomes are markedly worse in poor and developing countries relative to their 
wealthier counterparts; many of the factors (such as age) and co-morbidities (diabetes, heart disease, 
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hypertension and so forth) that currently appear to be associated with worse health outcomes for 
individuals infected with SARS-Cov-2 are more prevalent in wealthier countries.2  
The effectiveness of NPIs may be constrained in poorer countries, due to conditions of poverty such 
as overcrowding and poor sanitation infrastructure. Furthermore, in African (and other developing) 
countries health systems are typically poorly resourced and fragile, limiting the scope for effective 
containment measures unless initiated very early. As a result, in many countries it is simply impossible 
to prevent hospital capacity from being rapidly exceeded even with mitigation measures (Nkengasong 
and Mankoula 2020; Divala et al. 2020). On the economic and social dimension, however, the 
consequences of NPIs are likely to be more dire in relative terms; a large decline in household income, 
broadly defined, across a population would lead to large numbers of people falling into absolute 
poverty and complete destitution in poorer countries (Sumner et al. 2020) whereas in wealthier 
countries the absolute consequences would be far less severe. Such differences in non-
epidemiological outcomes of NPIs are further exacerbated by the limited fiscal and other resources at 
the disposal of the governments of lower income countries to implement social and economic 
protection measures to offset such effects. It follows, then, that striking an appropriate balance 
between epidemiological and non-epidemiological outcomes is even more crucial for lower income 
countries. However, the earliest and most influential epidemiological studies of optimal policy 
responses to Covid-19, while suggesting entirely different responses, were concerned with developed 
countries and utilised model parameterisations that corresponded to detailed data from such 
countries (Flaxman et al. 2020; Lourenco et al. 2020). 
The second critical dimension of an optimal policy response is temporal. The balance referred to above 
needs to reflect the way in which a national epidemic, or threat thereof, will evolve over time: “The 
aim of mitigation is to reduce the impact of an epidemic by flattening the curve, reducing peak 
incidence and overall deaths” (Ferguson et al. 2020, 7). Implementing drastic measures may be 
temporally optimal if it succeeds in containing a country’s epidemic (‘crushing the curve’). On the 
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other hand, implementing such measures without achieving containment could incur significant costs 
with comparatively little health benefit – preventing or reducing a first wave but ultimately 
experiencing a second wave that is little different to what the first wave would have been with less 
extreme measures. In making the decision of how to spread resources and mitigation measures across 
time, country-specific factors such as climate and religious festivals may also be relevant. 
One additional biomedical consideration in choosing between different mitigation measures is the 
prospect of a vaccine. Estimates for the development of an approved vaccine, even with hastened 
trials and approvals, vary from six months to the possibility that no vaccine may be produced (Calina 
et al. 2020). This does not account for challenges in production and distribution that are likely to 
disproportionately delay the speed and scope of access for less wealthy countries (Lurie et al. 2020). 
Given that such countries also have less resources to sustain highly restrictive NPIs it follows that a 
strategy premised on waiting for a vaccine is not just sub-optimal but likely to be outside the feasible 
set of alternatives. And since vaccines typically only reduce probability of infection rather than 
eliminate it, the importance of behavioural factors means the net effect of a vaccine on infection rates 
and mortality would not be a simple function of biomedical efficacy (Talamàs and Vohra 2020). 
In relation to economic and social consequences, some have argued that ‘the virus harms the 
economy not lockdowns’. There are two main pillars to this claim. First, that countries adopting 
measures of different stringency appear to have similar economic outcomes based on current 
evidence and forecasts.3 Second, that fears of infection will cause individuals to shun economic and 
social activity anyway, regardless of the measures governments might put in place to enforce these. 
We disagree with the basic claim on the grounds that it is either false or tautological. As shown in 
Figure 1, economic outcomes are partly a function of the actions of other countries and therefore 
comparisons will understate the differences in outcomes that are causally due to different 
approaches. From a strategic perspective, one could nevertheless argue that the negative economic 
consequences of the actions of country N on its own economy are less important if all other countries 
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(_N) have decided on drastic action.4 While this is true and perhaps important for policymaking, it is a 
tautologous argument in general since it claims that economic consequences of drastic measures are 
negligible if almost all countries take drastic measures. An additional problem is a contradiction in the 
approach to individual beliefs about the risk of the virus. Proponents of the view that individual beliefs 
will lead to negative outcomes have also been among those at the forefront of arguing for 
interventions to manipulate beliefs to induce greater compliance with social distancing and other 
NPIs; if beliefs are malleable then where evidence supports a mild mitigation approach it 
correspondingly makes sense for all but high-risk individuals to behave in accordance with the 
assumption that they will be infected, in which case economic activity may be minimally affected by 
the virus per se. 
 
Figure 1 Endogeneity of economic outcomes in response to country measures 
A notable implication of the above, given the uncertainty about the SARS-Cov-2 virus and Covid-19 
illness, is the possibility of a divergence between the merits of the policymaking process and welfare 
outcomes. The greatest such disjuncture would occur in a scenario where it is not actually possible to 
contain the virus, a significant proportion of the population had some level of pre-existing immunity, 
and the costs of stringent measures to contain transmission exceed the costs of uncontrolled spread. 
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For this reason it is important to separate the basis for decisions from outcomes, a point which applies 
not just to policymakers but the rationality of positions taken by scientists and scientific advisors 
(Laudan 1978). Many responses to Covid-19 appear reluctant to accept this separation, leading to 
conflation of milder mitigation policies with uncaring or reckless governments and schadenfreude at 
any negative outcomes experienced by such countries; Sweden is the leading example of such 
sentiments despite thorough analysis of its policy process painting a quite different picture (Angner 
and Arrhenius 2020). Such nuances are important for our analysis of the South African case, which is 
based on the conceptual framework sketched above. 
2. South Africa’s response and initial consequences 
South Africa’s first confirmed case of Covid-19 was registered on the 5th of March 2020 – a citizen who 
had returned on the 1st of March from a visit to Italy. Until the 22nd of March, when the government 
stopped providing detailed information on case histories, the vast majority of confirmed cases had 
either travelled internationally or been in direct contact with someone who had (NICD 2020b). In the 
early stages the government appeared to err on the side of protecting economic activity; on the 4th of 
March the health minister replied to questions from members of parliament (MPs) about the merits 
of a travel ban by noting that “the hospitality industry was extremely concerned that decisions may 
be taken by the Health Department which would adversely affect them” (PMG 2020) and the 
department’s senior official emphasised challenges in banning flights from high risk countries. On the 
15th of March the government announced that it would create a National Command Council (NCC) to 
oversee its Covid-19 response and the president declared a national disaster in order to invoke the 
powers necessary to promulgate border closures, flight bans on nationals of designated high-risk 
countries and social distancing regulations (Republic of South Africa 2020a).  
It remains unclear how and why the government changed course so rapidly, as Cabinet minutes are 
classified by default and have not been made public in this instance. The proximity of the decision to 
the release of the influential ‘Imperial Report’ on 16 March (Ferguson et al. 2020) is suggestive. The 
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government had also created a ministerial advisory committee (MAC) for the health minister. 
Although its membership and composition was initially kept secret, it later transpired that it contained 
45 members of whom the majority were medical scientists but included some government 
representatives. The manner in which the MAC’s advice fed into deliberations and decisions by the 
NCC has not been made clear, nor has the role of any non-medical experts in the policymaking process. 
The legal status of the NCC itself remains unclear and subject to a number of court challenges, which 
may yet render the decisions taken by that entity unconstitutional; such a ruling may not have much 
practical import but the possibility has some relevance to our interest in the state’s decision making 
process. Lack of clarity on the NCC’s status contributed to the failure of the national parliament to 
conduct oversight over the most important government decisions relating to the pandemic, though it 
eventually did do so on subordinate matters such as school closures and military deployment.  
The content of the initial announcement of a national disaster suggests that the government had 
already decided on a strict lockdown, given the statement that “[in addition to] dramatic decline in 
economic activity in our major trading partners, a sudden drop in international tourism and severe 
instability across all global markets…the measures we are required to take to contain the spread of 
the disease…will have a potentially severe impact [on economic outcomes]”. From such statements 
it is also clear that the government had some awareness of the trade-offs it was making, but what 
remains unclear is how economic, social and epidemiological considerations were weighed in the 
South African decision-making process or how that was achieved.  
Figure 2 shows how the South African epidemic progressed over the period discussed by this paper –
the first three months – along with key decisions and events. Three issues in particular are worth 
noting: that the number of deaths remained low throughout; the lockdown did not contain spread; 
and, that the government began to ease lockdown regulations even as the number of infections 
escalated.5 Separate data on excess mortality from natural causes up until the end of May 2020 did 




The president’s statement when announcing the initial 21 day lockdown is worth quoting at length: 
It is clear from the development of the disease in other countries and from our own 
modelling that immediate, swift and extraordinary action is required if we are to 
prevent a human catastrophe of enormous proportions in our country. Our 
fundamental task at this moment is to contain the spread of the disease. I am 
concerned that a rapid rise in infections will stretch our health services beyond 
what we can manage and many people will not be able to access the care they 
need. We must therefore do everything within our means to reduce the overall 
number of infections and to delay the spread of infection over a longer period – 
what is known as flattening the curve of infections. 
… 
Our analysis of the progress of the epidemic informs us that we need to urgently 
and dramatically escalate our response. The next few days are crucial. Without 
Figure 2 South Africa's Covid-19 epidemic: 5 March to 24 May 
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decisive action, the number of people infected will rapidly increase from a few 
hundred to tens of thousands, and within a few weeks to hundreds of thousands. 
This is extremely dangerous for a population like ours, with a large number of 
people with suppressed immunity because of HIV and TB, and high levels of poverty 
and malnutrition. We have learnt a great deal from the experiences of other 
countries. Those countries that have acted swiftly and dramatically have been far 
more effective in controlling the spread of the disease. As a consequence, the 
National Coronavirus Command Council has decided to enforce a nation-wide 
lockdown for 21 days with effect from midnight on Thursday 26 March. This is a 
decisive measure to save millions of South Africans from infection and save the lives 
of hundreds of thousands of people. While this measure will have a considerable 
impact on people’s livelihoods, on the life of our society and on our economy, the 
human cost of delaying this action would be far, far greater. 
It is evident from the reference to the short time for action (‘the next few days are crucial’) and the 
purpose of doing so (‘save the lives of hundreds of thousands’) that the government was acting on 
advice suggesting a catastrophe. It has not released the modelling used at the time. One media report 
on the 19th of March, which has not subsequently been denied, claimed that government’s action 
followed presentation of modelling to the Cabinet that showed “a slow and inadequate response by 
government to the outbreak, could result in anywhere between 87 900 and 351 000 deaths” and these 
estimates were based on, respectively, population infection rates of 10% to 40% (Cowan 2020a). The 
report noted that the projections were “based on studies of the virology and epidemiology of the virus 
in Wuhan”. 
Only on the 14th of April did the government give a detailed indication of what its actual strategy might 
be, in a briefing by the chair of the health minister’s advisory committee where the eight-stage 
strategy shown in Figure 3 was presented (Abdool Karim 2020a). The strategy’s most notable 
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characteristic was that it was premised on an escalation in transmission as the most likely scenario, 
but no indication was given of what proportion of the population was expected to be infected. At the 
time it was unclear whether the strategy was a recommendation from scientific advisors or 
government policy. What is even less clear, including from subsequent publication (Abdool Karim 
2020b), is whether the strategy represented government’s initial intentions. In the next section we 
argue that the evidence shows contradictory remarks from different actors, but suggests not only that 
the government felt it had to attempt containment but also that it believed it could achieve this. 
 
Figure 3 Strategy description by chair of ministerial advisory committee (14 April 2020) 
Preliminary epidemiological outcomes 
A major advantage for South Africa in responding to the pandemic was its significant laboratory testing 
capacity, which is the most sophisticated and sizeable on the continent. Initially, only individuals who 
had travelled to high risk countries or been in contact with infected or high risk individuals were 
encouraged to get tested and almost all of these tests were conducted at private facilities. 
Government guidelines stipulated that individuals who tested positive would need to self-isolate or 
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be quarantined and all contacts of that individual should be traced and tested if they met certain 
criteria (NICD 2020a). In order to facilitate contact tracing, government utilised an existing provision 
in legislation to introduce regulations allowing it to obtain data from mobile phones. In particular, that 
the head of the department of health could, “direct an electronic communications service provider to 
provide him or her with information regarding the location or movements of any person known, or 
reasonably suspected, to have contracted COVID-19 or any person known, or reasonably suspected, 
to have come into contact with such a person” (Department of Justice 2020). 
With the initiation of community testing and screening the number of tests conducted increased 
dramatically and by the end of May the public and private sectors were responsible for an 
approximately equal share of the 680,175 tests done, of which 24% were from community screening 
and 76% from passive case finding (NICD 2020f). The government stated that its objective was to reach 
a testing rate of 15,000 per day in April and 36,000 per day by the end of that month (Mabuza 2020), 
but in fact it only achieved a high of 11,630 by the end of April and had not consistently exceeded 
20,000 tests per day by the end of May. 
All-cause mortality initially declined in absolute terms and relative to simple official forecasts, 
apparently due to a reduction in unnatural deaths prevented by the strict lockdown (Bradshaw et al. 
2020b). These include motor vehicle accidents and violent crime, the prospects of which are likely to 
have been affected by banning of alcohol sales and limits on movement. Natural deaths remained 
within the 95% confidence interval of official forecasts, which was seen as providing tentative 
evidence to support the view that Covid-19 was not yet significantly more widespread than indicated 
by testing. This also means that using the second-best measure of excess mortality to proxy for Covid-
19 deaths yields the conclusion that the virus has not, by the end of May, resulted in a net increase in 
South African mortality rates. 
An official estimate of the reproductive number (‘R’) up to the 5th of May was only released on the 
27th of May and suggested that government measures reduced R from 2.07 (1.5 to 2.5) to 1.5 (NICD 
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2020e). While the confidence intervals for these estimates narrow over time as case numbers 
increase, they may nevertheless be biased by changes in selection effects relating to testing and 
screening. The most striking observation is that the largest decline appears to be associated with 
flights restrictions, border closures and school closures not the strict lockdown itself.7 
Figure 4 Official estimates of South Africa's reproductive number (R) 
 
Source: National Institute of Communicable Diseases (NICD 2020e) 
 
Health system preparedness 
The broader South African healthcare system is also relatively advanced by developing country 
standards but like other parts of society is characterised by sharp inequities between the costly but 
relatively high quality private system and the mostly free but heavily oversubscribed and under-
resourced public system. There is also significant variation within the public system, depending on 
institution type and geographical location. A clear intention throughout the first months of the 
epidemic was to increase total system capacity to handle Covid-19 admissions. Four areas of focus 
were: ICU beds, ventilators, general hospital beds, and personal protective equipment (PPE). The 
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government appears to have managed to secure sufficient supplies of PPEs through procurement and 
donations, though it has not provided detailed updates.  
The effort to produce ventilators partly followed from an emphasis in early media reporting on the 
Italian experience which emphasised ventilator requirements and shortage. In April the government 
stated that it expected to need 7,000 ventilators at the peak of the epidemic relative to an estimated 
stock of 3,216 of which 2,105 were in the private sector (Department of Health 2020a). In the context 
of a generally positive response to the government’s efforts, local ventilator production initiatives 
were also the subject of much media and public enthusiasm as an illustration of the ability of different 
stakeholders – including the state arms manufacturer and a kitchen appliance manufacturing firm – 
to work together in the national interest (Schutz 2020a). In April it was announced that the United 
States had donated 1,000 ventilators although it is unclear when and if those were delivered. By the 
end of May, it was unclear what progress has been made with local production and the chair of the 
MAC’s public health sub-committees stated in his individual capacity that “investment in ventilators 
was a huge waste” (Harding 2020b) – a notable change in emphasis from the previous reference to 
‘ruthless efficiency’. 
The government also expected that 25,000 - 70,000 general hospital beds and 4,000 – 14,000 ICU beds 
would be needed at the epidemic’s peak. A month later, however, the government’s modelling 
collaboration produced estimates of peak ICU bed requirements of 20,000 to 40,000 and hospital bed 
requirements of 55,000 to 110,000 – where these reflected optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. While 
no final indication was issued of what the government expected to be able to provide, the 
presentation of the models suggested a limit of 90,000 general beds and 4,000 ICU beds (Silal et al. 
2020).   
Economic relief and social protection measures 
While South Africa’s lockdown was faster and more stringent than most other countries, its 
corresponding economic relief and social protection measures were initially far less. The package of 
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measures proposed at the outset involved little additional spending and rather sought to reposition 
the Unemployment Insurance Fund, which had more than a R100billion in reserves, to support 
workers, along with various forms of tax relief. Though the president had claimed that “we are 
supporting the vulnerable” (Republic of South Africa 2020b), the government’s initial social protection 
measures were paltry and largely relied on donations to a Solidarity Fund which itself was more 
oriented toward procuring personal protective equipment (PPE). It took significant pressure from civil 
society coalitions to persuade the state that large-scale social protection measures were necessary 
and a decision to implement these – in the form of an increase in the child support grant and creation 
of a new ‘Covid-19 social relief of distress grant’ – was only announced on the 21st of April. 
In late April the Treasury announced its final proposals which amounted to R500billion or 
approximately 10% of GDP (National Treasury 2020). Of this, R95billion would be new expenditure 
financed by borrowing from international financial institutions, R130billion would be reprioritised 
expenditure (including an additional R20billion to healthcare) and R200billion would consist of credit 
guarantees issues to commercial banks. Of the increased expenditure, R50billion was allocated to 
social protection. However, bureaucratic delays meant that by the end of May (10 weeks into the 
lockdown) 6.3million valid applications had been received but only 100,000 recipients were expected 
to be paid by the end of the month. 
Easing the lockdown: a ‘risk-adjusted strategy’ 
As with other aspects of the government’s response, the process by which the economic and social 
protection package was developed remains unclear. It is notable, in particular, that when the 
government announced a strategy for gradual easing of the lockdown key details were announced by 
the Department of Health rather than the Treasury. In keeping with the international narrative 
discussed in the preceding section, the department’s senior official stated that “[it is] important to 
emphasise that, in terms of economic activity, the pandemic—and not the public health measures—
will depress the economy’ (Pillay 2020). And the government specifically referenced Correia, Luck, 
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and Verner (2020) in defending its prior approach (Republic of South Africa 2020d). It nevertheless 
proposed (Republic of South Africa 2020d) a relaxation of the lockdown using three criteria for 
determining which economic sectors could resume activity: 
1. Risk of transmission (including the ease of implementing mitigation measures) 
2. Expected impact on the sector of continued lockdown (including prior 
vulnerability) 
3. Value of the sector to the economy (e.g. contribution to GDP, multiplier effects, 
export earnings) 
In applying these, though, the health minister stated that sectors should be subject to an “ordinal 
ranking of priority” (Government of South Africa 2020b). This is significant from a welfare-optimisation 
since decision criteria based on ordinal rankings are almost always sub-optimal. 
The broad characteristics and intentions of each level of the lockdown are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 




Figure 5 Risk-adjusted strategy: infographic for the general public 
 
Figure 6 Risk-adjusted strategy: infographic presented to Parliament (Republic of South Africa 
2020d) 
At the end of May, shortly before the country was due to move to Level 3 of the lockdown, the 
president held a briefing with newspaper editors in which he stated that while its scientific advisors 
had recently recommended an immediate move to Level 1, the country did not yet meet World Health 
Organisation guidelines (WHO 2020a) for doing so. Those guidelines propose six criteria for “managing 
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a controlled and deliberate transition from a scenario of community transmission to a sustainable, 
steady state of low-level or no transmission”, none of which South Africa seemed likely to meet until 
its epidemic had run its course. An obvious concern is that the guidelines, which were published on 
the 14th of April, fail to consider any factors other than epidemiological ones – notably the 
consequences of ongoing lockdown measures. 
Public response 
None of the polls and surveys conducted in South Africa during the critical months of March and April 
are entirely satisfactory in terms of their claims to national representativeness, but they provide some 
systematic indication of public sentiment.8 One internet-based poll found that more than 80% of 
respondents across a range of characteristics expressed support for the strict lockdown (IPSOS 2020a) 
despite belief that it would have a significantly negative economic impact on them and others (IPSOS 
2020b). An indication that this may not have been in keeping with epidemiological evidence is 
reflected in the fact that more than 50% of respondents believed infection with SARS-Cov-2 would 
‘very seriously’ or ‘extremely seriously’ affect their health, when in fact South Africa’s rates of 
hospital admissions and deaths up to that point, and subsequently, have been lower than or equal to 
international averages.9 Such was the initial positive reaction that some began to tout the health 
minister’s performance as leading to a future presidential position (M. Cohen and Vecchiatto 2020). 
The broader public response was mirrored in the responses of particular societal stakeholders. Non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), trade unions, political parties and organised business largely 
welcomed the government’s initial approach (Manyathela 2020). Among the reasons cited were the 
risk of large numbers of deaths and contrast with apparently anti-scientific or reckless approaches by 
governments and leaders in other countries. Subsequent dissent concerned two specific issues: NGOs 
raised concerns about unintended consequences and inadequate social protection for poor and 
vulnerable groups. The private sector complained about specific lockdown regulations being 
unwarrantedly harmful to their interests and the economy at large, with bans on tobacco and alcohol 
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sales being a particular target of criticism from various quarters. Both sets of issues were given 
significant media attention and dominated objections to the strict lockdown itself – although the main 
opposition party, having supported the initial lockdown, later argued against the extension of those 
measures based on economic harms (Steenhuisen 2020). Given the acceptance of the necessity of a 
lockdown, there was little pressure during this crucial period for the state to release its modelling or 
the substantive basis for its decisions. 
3. An opaque, ineffective strategy shielded by performative scientism 
The government’s public presentation of its approach repeatedly and heavily emphasised its use of 
science and scientists. But as Samoff argued in this journal in relation to the scientism of the early 
1990s, “policy makers who are largely guided by research focused on the issue to be decided do not 
necessarily make better decisions” (Samoff 1996, 617). Debates about scientism have recently been 
resurrected in philosophy (Boudry and Pigliucci 2017) and here we use the term in line with Haack’s 
description of it as an “inappropriately deferential attitude to science” (Haack 2012). She suggests ‘six 
signs of scientism’ and there are three in particular that are evident in the South African response to 
Covid-19: using words like ‘science’ as generic praise (and therefore invoking credibility), looking to 
sciences for answers outside their scope, and (implicitly or explicitly) denigrating other forms of 
inquiry (Haack 2012, 77–78).  
Rhetorical scientism 
The government made a particular point throughout its response of emphasising its reliance on 
‘science’ and ‘scientists’, and this was immediately reflected in media coverage. The following 
statement by the President encapsulates the general tenor: 
when they look at us, [international bodies such as the World Health Organisation] 
truly see a shining example of how countries should have responded to the 
challenge of COVID-19. Also, the important thing is that we have relied on science. 
We haven’t been flying by the seat of my pants and thumb sucking everything. The 
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fact that [the health minister] enlisted top-class scientists and doctors as we saw, 
led by Prof Karim, has positioned us very well because we haven’t been sending out 
confusing messages.(Government of South Africa 2020b) 
The headlines and adjectives used by the press were no less effusive with repeated references to ‘top 
experts’, ‘world-class scientists’, ‘scientific advice’ and ‘mathematical modeling’. This dimension of 
scientism was reinforced by numerous positive contrasts by journalists and academics with South 
Africa’s earlier era of HIV/AIDS denialism (Malan 2020) in which the governing party resisted the 
consensus among medical scientists, thereby delaying the provision of anti-retrovirals to prevent 
mother-to-child transmission and for treatment, contributing to conspiracy theories and at times 
peddling pseudoscience (Makgoba 2000; Marks 2007). 
Rhetorical scientism manifested also in the use of specific terminology related to epidemiological 
strategies, most notably the notion of ‘flattening the curve’. That this was essentially rhetorical is 
reflected in the fact that the government never stated its specific objectives: the extent to which it 
hoped to reduce the peak number of infections, whether it also intended to reduce the area under 
the curve, over what period this was expected to take place, and so forth. It also contributed to a false 
rhetorical binary with ‘herd immunity’ which was deemed, incorrectly, to refer to entirely unmitigated 
spread through a population.10 The consequence being that the same health journalist could state 
about the South African case in late March that, “We can’t stop this virus from spreading” (Malan 
2020) then in late April state that “a COVID-19 strategy based on herd immunity is bad” (Suárez 2020). 
Did South Africa ‘flatten the curve’? 
What were the consequences of scientism? We suggest that it concealed inconsistencies in, and 
failures of, the government’s approach by facilitating acceptance of unsubstantiated claims. The 
minister of health, president, chair of the MAC, and various other advisors claimed that ‘the lockdown 
worked’. As we have seen, some went further and made the more specific claim that ‘the lockdown 
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saved lives’. These assertions were reported largely uncritically by the media, but do they hold up to 
scrutiny? 
In the abstract, the notion of flattening a curve could be subject to differing interpretations. In 
particular, it could mean reducing the total number of infections (reducing the area under the curve), 
or reducing the maximum number of infections at any given time (reducing the peak but not the area). 
As we have already seen, the government’s intentions at the outset were far from clear and appeared 
to change unannounced. On the 20th of March the health minister stated that he expected “60-70% 
of the population” to ultimately be infected with Covid-19. That is perhaps consistent with the 
catastrophic mortality forecasts that initially triggered the government’s response but raises the 
question as to what the long-term plan was if not containment. The medical scientist leading the 
government’s testing indicated later that she was surprised (Cowan 2020b) at new research showing 
a high proportion of asymptomatic cases – evidently under the belief that the National Institute of 
Communicable Diseases was capturing the vast majority of positive cases through symptom-based 
testing (either patient-initiated or as an outcome of community screening).  
The projections and counterfactuals released by government’s modellers two months after the 
lockdown was begun suggested a peak flattened from 12 million to 10 million (pessimistic) or 8 million 
(optimistic) and delayed from early June to mid-July or mid-August (NICD 2020c). But those were 
based on assumptions about efficacy of the lockdown that have not been empirically corroborated. 
The more damning point is that the leading epidemiological model supporting a strict lockdown 
strategy (Ferguson et al. 2020) envisaged ‘flattening the curve’ as attempting to keep ICU bed demand 
below the number of beds available. While the government declined to provide detailed information 
on the number and availability of such beds nationally (Mashishi 2020), reports suggested that the 
number of such beds in the public sector had only increased from 2,512 to 2,719 between March and 
June (Cowan and Evans 2020).11 Since the government’s own projections subsequently showed that 
such demand was expected to vastly exceed the supply, and that the supply had not markedly 
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increased during the lockdown, it follows that South Africa did not flatten the curve for any reason 
related to its response. 
Linked to this are the claims about reductions in mortality mentioned in our introduction. The 
epidemiological modelling consortium noted that, “The effect, in particular on mortality, of not being 
able to meet ICU and ventilator demand is not taken into account in the model, nor are the effects of 
any rationing of these resources.” (NICD 2020c). This is remarkable because it implies that the more 
sophisticated models on which the government based its decisions after instating the lockdown 
cannot reflect the actual benefit of flattening the curve in the sense of Ferguson et al. (2020). To do 
so would require the use of parameters representing differences in mortality rates for patients with 
different severity of illness under different treatment scenarios (home treatment, hospital admission 
and ICU admission). The government does not appear to have published any assumptions or estimates 
of these key parameters and there is no indication that such parameters have informed policy 
decisions. 
The scope of medical science 
The available evidence suggests that government relied almost solely on medical scientists to 
determine its initial response to the epidemic and it did so on the basis of deference to their expertise. 
That is a sub-optimal approach within the framework we outlined in section 1. It also constitutes a 
form of scientism on two dimensions: it seeks answers from medical scientists – particularly 
epidemiologists – that are outside the scope of their expertise and, in doing so, implicitly disparages 
other sources of knowledge especially in the social sciences. This is reflected in the apparently 
unsophisticated approach to a spectrum of possible strategic options. 
Besides the critique above of claimed successes, the counterfactual scenario used to make such claims 
was one in which the state took no measures at all, which is inappropriate or at least overly simplistic. 
Even at the outset few local critics of the lockdown argued against any measures to slow the spread 
of the virus but rather endorsed less extreme measures (Broadbent and Smart 2020; Muller 2020) 
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such as those the government instituted immediately after invoking powers under the National 
Disaster Act. Similarly, later critics – including the chair of the health minister’s advisory sub-
committee on public health – argued for “a unified health and economic strategy that allows for some 
economic activity while inhibiting the uncontrolled spread of the virus”. Thus the relevant 
counterfactual to the stringent lockdown was not wholesale inaction but various forms of less drastic, 
and therefore less socially and economically costly, action. In fact, the estimates of R shown in  Figure 
4 provide preliminary support to the view that fewer restrictions could have been almost as effective 
but incurred much lower costs.  
A second point that appears to have been entirely neglected by all parties is that the government 
could have maintained its initial measures for longer and thereby retained the option of a stringent 
lockdown at a later stage. In fact, our reading of Ferguson et al. (2020) is that such an approach is 
precisely what those authors suggest where containment is not possible. They note that: 
Introducing such interventions too early risks allowing transmission to return once 
they are lifted (if insufficient herd immunity has developed); it is therefore 
necessary to balance the timing of introduction with the scale of disruption 
imposed and the likely period over which the interventions can be maintained. In 
this scenario, interventions can limit transmission to the extent that little herd 
immunity is acquired – leading to the possibility that a second wave of infection is 
seen once interventions are lifted (Ferguson et al. 2020, 7–8) 
The available evidence suggests that the latter scenario may accurately characterise the South African 
approach. So while the imposition of a stringent lockdown was praised for ‘strong and decisive 
leadership’, and was well-intentioned, it may have been excessive. This sheds an unflattering light on  
the president’s initial stance that : “there can be no half measures” (Republic of South Africa 2020a). 
Ultimately, the folly of the government’s approach was evidenced in it being forced into easing its 
lockdown because of the economic and social costs incurred. 
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Sacrificing of nuance 
Other nuanced strategic considerations were arguably also a casualty of the narrow epidemiology-
focused approach that emerged from the government’s scientism. The first example is related to the 
matter of critical care beds. While the original Imperial model emphasised the danger of 
overwhelming the healthcare system, that is somewhat endogenous: it depends on criteria used for 
admission, approach to treatment, use of ventilators and palliative care. For example, Germany’s 
relatively low mortality rate has been attributed in part to its efforts to limit hospital admissions 
through home-based care and monitoring. Such strategies appear even more important for 
developing countries with very limited hospital and critical care capacity. While the South African 
government has sought to expand its available quarantine facilities and referred to the construction 
of ‘field hospitals for triage’ (Abdool Karim 2020a) there was little evidence of using clinical guidelines 
as a key part of managing the consequences of different epidemiological scenarios. 
A second nuance never seriously or widely discussed in the public domain was the government’s 
approach to testing and screening. As noted, the early approach focused on highly probable cases of 
Covid-19 based on travel histories and clear symptoms. This inevitably introduced a strong selection 
effect into the initial testing, as reflected in the almost wholesale use of private facilities. Similarly, 
when testing was then expanded to community level the purpose was never made clear. The use of 
pre-screening for relevant symptoms meant that the initiative failed to provide useful local data on 
the proportion of asymptomatic cases. And in the push to increase test numbers the state 
overestimated its bureaucratic dynamism and neglected the importance of turnaround times for the 
efficacy of its containment-like self-isolation, quarantining and contact tracing strategy (Department 
of Health 2020b). An epidemiologist on the MAC noted in April that, “Testing at scale by the end of 
May, which I think is what [the government’s] target is, pretty much becomes a meaningless exercise” 
(Schutz 2020b). This contradicts the earlier claims by the chair of the MAC about the uniqueness of 
SA’s active case finding and its use of 28,000 community healthcare workers (Abdool Karim 2020a), 
which were widely and positively reported in the press. 
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A final nuance concerns the link between the timing of the epidemic peak, co-morbidities and seasonal 
flu. One argument for the government’s response over-and-above the dire projections it received was 
the prevalence of particular risk factors in the general population such as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis 
(TB). For instance, some findings suggest that HIV-infected individuals with severe acute respiratory 
infection associated with influenza had significantly higher mortality rates (C. Cohen et al. 2015; 
Tempia et al. 2014), while others link HIV and other widespread diseases such as TB to mortality during 
the H1N1 pandemic in 2009 (Phaswana-Mafuya et al. 2020).  
Yet the latter authors note that it was also the case that, while these diseases were associated with 
higher mortality within the population, “population-level morbidity and mortality related to [H1N1] 
was notably much lower in [South Africa] compared with countries in the Northern Hemisphere 
generally”. Given the possible impact of the South African winter (that occurs mid-year), respiratory 
virus transmission, and significant easing of lockdown restrictions, it appears entirely possible ex ante 
that delaying the peak into winter months could lead to worse mortality outcomes. This is evidenced 
by efforts to exhort the government to increase uptake of the seasonal influenza vaccine to “reduce 
the likelihood of a ‘double hit” of SARS-Cov-2 and seasonal flu” (Preiser, Mendelson, and Taljaard 
2020). Also notable is the authors’ hope that, “Reducing morbidity and mortality through better 
influenza vaccination uptake might be one good thing to come out of this new public health threat” – 
reflecting either the ineffectiveness of the health system, or lack of urgency of the state, in avoiding 
similar causes of mortality prior to the current pandemic.12 
Linked to this is emerging evidence that the lockdown undermined broader public health efforts to 
detect and treat TB: 
The COVID-19 level 5 restrictions has [sic] resulted in a ~ 48% average weekly 
decrease in TB Xpert testing volumes…the number of TB positive declined by 
33%...These   unintended   consequences will have a negative impact of efforts to 
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control TB which remains the leading infectious disease cause of death in South 
Africa currently (NICD 2020d)  
Given the tentative lessons from South Africa’s experience of the H1N1 pandemic (Phaswana-Mafuya 
et al. 2020), it is conceivable that a crude attempt to reduce transmission in the entire population that 
decreases TB detection and treatment could increase mortality relative to the counterfactual of 
interventions targeted at high risk individuals. 
Scientism undermines good science 
Excessive deference to the views or advice of scientists at a given point in time can contribute to an 
environment that is hostile to practices that are often considered to be characteristic of good science. 
Two such practices were undermined in the South African case: openness/transparency in scientific 
advice and associated policy decisions; and, independence of opinion. Despite initial positive 
statements by the state about ‘open science’, we have already noted that the government withheld 
publication of its models and projections until early May and has not released the initial projections it 
acted upoin. In addition, there has been a reluctance to make important data publicly available 
(Marivate and Combrink 2020) and this was reflected in international open Covid-19 datasets where 
South African data was amongst the sparsest available within those countries that have comparable 
data collection capacity (Xu et al. 2020). 
The façade of consensus created by the state’s scientism cracked when Glenda Gray the chair of one 
of its subcommittees, and chair of the Medical Research Council (SAMRC), criticised the lockdown 
regulations as ‘unscientific’ and raised concern about perceived increases in the prevalence of 
malnutrition. Both the health minister and his senior official responded with sharp criticisms of their 
own and the latter requested an investigation by the SAMRC. That organisation apologised for its 
chair’s actions and promised to institute an investigation – a decision it withdrew after a petition 
supported by hundreds of academics defending Gray’s right to academic freedom and freedom of 
expression. Ironically, however, a number of these academics had themselves been responsible for 
29 
 
contributing to scientism (ASSAf 2020) both rhetorically and by making claims about the efficacy of 
the government’s interventions. 
Behavioural consequences 
The government’s lack of transparency on key issues combined with its performance of scientism 
appears to have had an effect on public perceptions that benefitted government in the short run, but 
may undermine its efforts (and possibly popularity) in the medium- and long-run. As noted in section 
2, the government’s actions had high approval but that was premised on a belief in the catastrophic 
allusions made by the president in his declaration of a national disaster. The government’s subsequent 
messaging sought to encourage compliance with the lockdown regulations, thereby amplifying the 
original perception. 
Yet in attempting to pivot its strategy, having exhausted its very limited economic and fiscal buffers, 
the government was then faced with the challenge of getting individuals to act in ways that it 
discouraged with dire warnings previously. The difficulty in doing so manifested earliest in opposition 
by parents and teacher unions to even a relatively cautious reopening of schools. And the closure of 
medical facilities in response to detection of a single Covid-19 infection left the state frustrated at 
what it perceived to be overreaction by healthcare workers. The overall result being the incongruous 
conclusion that despite the government inducing fear in the population, “Experts say the fear factor 
about coronavirus needs to be addressed” (Harding 2020b). 
Another example is the furious societal reaction to the announcement that the regulations for Level 3 
of the national lockdown (Government of South Africa 2020c; Republic of South Africa 2020e) in effect 
from 1 June 2020 would allow faith-based services to resume with a limit of 50 people at any given 
time, provided all congregants wear masks and social distancing regulations are observed. That 
understandably caused consternation, given national and international evidence that religious 
congregation has been the source of ‘super-spreader’ events where one, or a small number of people, 
infects many others. The result was that commentators, journalists and even the coordinator of the 
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government’s epidemiological modelling effort expressed dismay that the decision reflects an 
approach which is “utterly irrational”. Yet the reopening of places of worship and schools could also 
be part of a deliberate effort to partially hasten the spread of the virus through the population, in-line 
with a ‘herd immunity’ strategy. 
These examples point to the danger of using scientism to engender public support, since it potentially 
compromises the critical link between policy, behavioural response and pandemic outcomes (Rasul 
2020). 
Slow, inadequate and inefficient social protection 
From the perspective of evidence-based policymaking a particularly unusual aspect of the situation, 
as in other countries, is that it was possible to anticipate the negative economic and social 
consequences of the strict lockdown with more confidence than the epidemiological outcomes. The 
reason is that strict lockdowns simply shut down much formal economic activity – subject of course 
to country-specific compliance and enforcement. In South Africa, compliance and enforcement 
appeared high for formal sector activities, which constitute a much higher proportion of economic 
activity than in comparator countries. Prospective economic analysis using tools such as social 
accounting matrices are often, rightly, criticised for strong assumptions about static economic 
structure over time and in the face of new interventions to estimate direct and indirect effects. Yet 
such methods are likely to be well-suited to predicting at least the formal sector and aggregate 
consequences of crude interventions of this kind in the South African case. Using such methods Arndt 
et al. (2020) estimate the largest negative effects of the lockdown on sectors that were almost entirely 
shut down, such as alcoholic beverages and tobacco (greater than 60%) the sale of which was 
prohibited. Whereas sectors like pharmaceuticals, health services, communication and agriculture, 
which were declared an essential service, were expected to experience a mild decline of less than 
10%. The lockdown itself was expected to reduce government’s annual tax revenue by 27%, rising to 
32.5% when macroeconomic factors were included. Given that public finances were already under 
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significant pressure after years of failing to stabilise growth in the debt-to-GDP ratio, revenue losses 
alone will have fiscal consequences for years to come.  
In relation to households, the first-round effects would have a larger, absolute and relative, impact on 
wealthier deciles partly because lower deciles were dependent on government grants which would 
remain constant. However, as in other countries, lower-skilled workers were expected to be worst 
affected. Analogous mechanical calculations by other authors using nationally-representative 
household survey data showed that the extreme poverty rate among vulnerable households could be 
expected to triple without government intervention (Bassier et al. 2020) due in particular to the 
impact on households with informal workers. Yet despite this the government failed to even conceive 
of the need for enhanced social protection for poor and vulnerable households, focusing its attention 
almost entirely on protecting the formal economy. This suggests that the state’s scientism affected 
policymaking not only in relation to lockdown decisions but also in the low weight placed on non-
medical and non-epidemiological considerations. 
4. Conclusion 
As with all countries, South Africa faced many challenges in deciding on an appropriate response to 
the Covid-19 pandemic. Unlike some others, the government has acted in a manner which suggests a 
primary concern with public health and a desire to act on the best available evidence. Despite that, it 
failed to adequately appreciate the economic and social consequences of its actions when making 
critical decisions and acted far too slowly in initiating the provision of social protection to support its 
lockdown. In reacting hastily to imitate an international trend in instituting lockdowns, the state 
appears to have given little consideration to country-specific characteristics that may have suggested 
a somewhat different approach. In all notable respects, the measures taken to combat the spread of 
SARS-Cov-2 have worsened inequality, vulnerability and poverty, while substantially weakening public 
finances and therefore future prospects of tackling what were already enormous challenges. These 
effects on the country’s development will be felt for at least a few years but could extend to an entire 
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generation. That alone calls into question the government’s response, however narrowly well-
intentioned.  
Placing such consequences alongside the apparent failure of such efforts to have a large impact on 
the preparedness of the healthcare system and the long-term trajectory of the epidemic presents a 
damning picture of the government response. At the end of May, the WHO classified South Africa’s 
‘country preparedness capacity’ as only at Level 3 preparedness – along with many other African 
countries (including Tanzania) and below Brazil (WHO 2020c). The available evidence on the 
government’s decision-making process suggests that in its determination to be seen to do the right 
thing, the state fell into the trap of performative scientism. That led to a decision-making process that 
was secretive and based on advice that exuded incredible certitude (Manski 2013), manifesting in an 
initially paternalistic stance that was hostile to, or dismissive of, dissenting views. The result was 
excessive reliance on, and confidence in, catastrophic projections that informed the original lockdown 
decision. Government’s recognition of its resultant overreaction began to filter through in its risk-
adjusted strategy but it arguably moved too slowly in changing course, likely due to some combination 
of political and bureaucratic incentives along with difficulty in navigating which expertise to rely on. 
South Africa’s comparatively robust media and civil society institutions failed to serve as corrective 
mechanisms at key moments as they were also caught up in the performative process. Few other 
countries appeared to have suffered from such a sharp disjuncture between rhetoric of scientism and 
the reality of a deeply flawed policymaking process that produced sub-optimal decisions with incorrect 
premises and societally damaging outcomes. 
There had been some correction at the time of writing, as reflected in the citations of data and analysis 
released by state agencies and advisors. The president’s stance at the end of May suggests, however, 
that the corollary of government’s scientism was a view that scientists be the ones ultimately 
accountable for the policy trajectory:  
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“The scientists are the ones who continue to lead our effort in all of this. They have 
advised us that we needed to impose a lockdown, which we did. They said it will 
help flatten the curve of the infections, and with that we will have sufficient time 
to prepare ourselves, to prepare our healthcare system, to prepare our tools to be 
able to deal with the spike that is to follow. They also said once we went through 
Level 5 and Level 4, they also said the lockdown has served its 
purpose”...Ramaphosa emphasised that the government's response was wholly 
guided by scientific opinion (Hunter 2020) 
There are two evident problems with this. First, the extant evidence suggests a lack of consensus 
among government’s scientific advisors on various key issues and the manner in which the NCC came 
to decisions based on epidemiological, public health, economics and broader advice remains 
unknown. Indeed, it was precisely the lack of transparency about that process which led to stringent 
public criticism by members of the MAC and subsequent harsh response from the government. In that 
light, the claim that a homogenous scientific consensus determined action is misleading. Second, 
outsourcing policy decisions in this fashion would be inconsistent with the obligations of 
democratically elected political leaders, whose constitutional rule requires them to balance a range of 
considerations that medical scientists are poorly equipped to adjudicate. Doing so would not just be 
inconsistent with a democratic mandate but also fail to identify a temporally optimal strategy. Yet the 
media was guilty of participating in the same logic, as illustrated by one editor’s naïve statement that: 
It is the science that gives the political decisions credibility. With the scientists 
providing the road map, it will be up to the politicians to make sure the country 
follows it.(Du Toit 2020) 
A better approach would have required a level-headed assessment of the limitations of the evidence 
available, recognition of the full scale of the negative consequences of a strict lockdown, substantive 
understanding of the intertemporal dimensions of the policy problem, and much greater procedural 
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transparency especially as regards the evidence relied on. For example, high initial mortality rates 
from northern Italy were evidently upwardly biased by the elderly population, prioritisation of testing 
for the severely ill, and corresponding inability to assess the proportion of asymptomatic individuals. 
Furthermore, even if strict lockdowns were effective elsewhere in reducing the rate of transmission, 
various aspects of South African society suggested that might not be the case locally and the country 
had less resources to sustain such an approach than Western nations. Finally, the highly selective 
detection of early cases through private facilities focused on wealthy individuals returning from 
overseas trips was not capable of detecting community transmission, which therefore could have been 
well under way before the strict lockdown was implemented. The alternative approach that emerges 
from such considerations would have been a more gradual escalation of non-pharmaceutical 
interventions, rather than panicked implementation of an extremely strict lockdown without 
adequate social support or convincing long-term rationale. 
In many policy situations, in South Africa or elsewhere, political constraints may explain sub-optimal 
policy. In this instance, however, the opposite has arguably been the case: the almost unfettered trust 
from citizens and all major sectors of society placed in the government's initial, critical decisions 
enabled sub-optimal decisions. Such unconditional support shielded decision-making at the most 
crucial stage from scrutiny that could have exposed flaws and concerns much earlier. Furthermore, 
constraints in terms of bureaucratic or state capacity - such as under-resourcing, corruption, wasteful 
spending and inefficiency - were well-known and therefore should have informed decisions ex ante 
rather than being cited ex post as reasons for poor outcomes or unintended consequences. 
The three broader lessons pertain to issues that have been elaborated on by various authors prior to 
the pandemic as being given inadequate attention even under relatively normal policymaking 
conditions. The first is the importance of treating expressions of ‘incredible certitude’ (Manski 2013; 
2020) with scepticism rather than acclaim, placing value on epistemic humility (Angner 2020) and 
developing the capacity of public institutions to make policy decisions that better-reflect limited 
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knowledge. The second is adequately recognising the challenges of external validity: to extrapolating 
evidence from one context to another (Rothwell 2005) not least when it may be confounded by 
endogeneity of various kinds. These two dimensions counteract tendencies towards scientism – 
performative or otherwise. The third is the importance of making policy for the context one has, rather 
than those one might wish to have, in a way that proactively considers unintended consequences 
(Merton 1936). 
The drastic nature of the decisions taken in the unforgiving context of a global pandemic are such that 
even a two-month period of misguided policymaking will leave a negative legacy for many years to 
come. Detailed examination of individual countries’ responses and the associated outcomes is crucial 
for separating rhetoric from what actually took place while learning from failures and successes. 
Having previously learned the lesson of the dangers of pseudoscience during a past era of HIV/AIDS 
denialism, South Africa’s response to Covid-19 may be a salutary lesson that the opposite extreme 
also has significant dangers – especially where scientific evidence is inconclusive and scientists 
themselves are unaccustomed to giving policy advice in novel, high-stakes situations. Rarely has there 
been a more dramatic illustration of the importance for development outcomes of nuanced 
understandings of evidence and expertise for public policy. 
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1Detailed regulations promulgated to formalise restrictions at different stages of the government’s lockdown 
may have been affected by rent-seeking efforts of vested interests, such as illicit tobacco traders, but this 
remains highly contested. 
2 There is evidence of worse outcomes for poorer communities within wealthier countries, such as African 
Americans in the United States (Yancy 2020). 
3 A popular example is Sweden – see for instance Andersen et al. (2020) for a substantive analysis which comes 
to this conclusion but fails to address the nuances we raise. Correia, Luck, and Verner (2020) make a similar 
argument based on experiences of cities in the United States during the 1918 flu pandemic. 
4 The relationships delineated in Figure 1 applies to countries that are not large enough to individually influence 
the world economy in  significant way. 
5 We have opted to use a linear rather than logarithmic scale since the latter is arguably not especially beneficial 
in the early stages of an epidemic and has other limitations (Romano et al. 2020). 
6 Subsequent data shows excess mortality from natural causes from approximately mid-June to mid-August 
(Bradshaw et al. 2020c) – this is outside the period considered by the present paper but does not contradict the 
arguments presented.  
7 This impression is strengthened by considering the incubation period of the virus. 
8 One initiative to collect data using mobile phones from a subset of an existing nationally representative panel, 
the Corononavirus Rapid Mobile Survey (CRAM), only began in May 2020. Other polls conducted by the country’s 
Human Sciences Research Council solicited responses in a non-systematic way and weighted these to match 
national demographics, making it impossible to responsibly interpret the findings about sentiment, compliance 
with regulations and other matters that would be of interest for our analysis. The conclusions of such studies 
may, nevertheless, have affected the government’s response, the stance of the media and public perceptions. 
9 And as shown in Figure 1, such beliefs are important for economic outcomes under different government 
approaches. 
10 This appears to have resulted from media coverage, internationally and locally, of the UK’s approach, which 
conflated the initial policy decision to ‘rapidly achieve herd immunity’ with the notion of herd immunity itself. 
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11 One widely-cited set of estimates suggested a total of 2,260 critical care beds in the public sector and 3,780 
in the private sector (van den Heever 2020). 
12 That also has bearing on our consideration of the massive trade-offs made to potentially reduce Covid-19 
mortality relative to the comparatively small cost of greater distribution of influenza vaccines. 
